POWER AND PRIDE
National Identity and Ethnopolitical Inequality around the World

By ANDREAS WIMMER*

I. Introduction

VARIOUS long-standing research traditions have sought to identify the causes and consequences of national identity. In sociology, the comparative historical analysis of nationalism—stretching from Hans Kohn to Rogers Brubaker and beyond[1]—has looked at the macropolitical forces that make and unmake national identities. For some comparative political scientists, a strong sense of belonging to the national community of citizens represents a key aspect of political development after decolonization.[2] Others have explored the positive and negative consequences of national pride, from tax compliance to attitudes toward immigrants. Social psychologists have studied microlevel mechanisms of national identification, most important, the relationship between subnational ethnic identities and "superordinate" categories such as the nation.[3]

In this article I zoom in on one particular aspect of this overall *problématique*, specifically, on the relationship between the ethnic background of individuals and the extent to which they are proud of their nation.

[1] Kohn 1944; Brubaker 1996.
[2] Deutsch 1953; Bendix 1964; Lemarchand 1972; Miguel 2004.
[3] Sidanius and Pratto 1999.

doi: 10.1017/S0043887117000120

Existing research argues that demographic minorities will identify less positively with the national community than will majorities, and it offers a series of distinct mechanisms by which this association between group size and national pride could come about. Building upon and at the same time going beyond this literature, I introduce an exchange-theoretic and power-configurational model of national pride. It posits that demographic size is not a determining factor in and of itself. Rather, it is political status, that is, the extent to which an ethnic group is represented in national-level government, that determines who identifies more positively with the national community of fellow citizens.

The theory focuses on the structure of the alliance networks through which individuals exchange political, economic, and symbolic resources with the state. Depending on an individual's standing in the overall power configuration, that individual will be able to develop more or less advantageous and dependable exchange relationships with actors representing national-level government. This, in turn, will influence how positively that individual evaluates the idea of the citizenry as a community of lived solidarity and shared political destiny. Accordingly, once we take into account the different positions that ethnic elites and their constituencies occupy within a national power structure, the demographic size of ethnic groups should not matter. Minorities that are politically dominant, such as Alawi in contemporary Syria, should identify as positively with their country and nation as do politically dominant majorities, such as ethnic Koreans in South Korea.

This article explores this argument and related hypotheses with data from around the world. I use a multitude of cross-national surveys that ask the same question about how proud respondents are of their country's nationality—in other words, whether they evaluate membership in the imagined community of the nation in positive terms. The questions refer to pride in the nation understood as the community of citizens, rather than pride in subnational ethnic groups or nationalities (as one finds in multinational states). The questions were asked in nationally representative surveys in 123 countries, and we have answers from 770,000 individuals. The citizens of these 123 countries represent about 92 percent of the world's population.

Many surveys also ask about the ethnic background of individuals, which allowed me, with a team of research assistants, to link the surveys with the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set. EPR offers information on the degree to which these ethnic groups were represented in national-level government, and we can therefore assess how access

to power affects national identification of group members. Linking the surveys to EPR was possible for a subsample of 165,000 individuals from 224 ethnic groups in 64 countries. I also took into account all other factors possibly affecting national pride that have been considered in the existing literature—individual levels of education, for example, or at the country level, whether the country has ever been colonized, fought wars of independence in the past, and so on.

These, in a nutshell, are the findings: Members of groups that are not represented in national government are less proud of their nation than are members of the polity. At the country level, the larger the share of the population that is excluded from representation in government, the less proud citizens are on average. Furthermore, past ethnic conflict, which reduces trust in the stability of one's current political status, is associated with less national pride at both group and country levels. Countries with power-sharing arrangements between two or more political elites are more unstable than more monolithic regimes; it increases uncertainty about one's future political status and therefore decreases national pride. Members of ethnic groups that currently occupy a less favorable position in the power structure than they did at an earlier time are less proud than those whose political status has not changed. I also briefly and tentatively explore possible reverse causation problems through a within-group, over-time analysis. I find that most groups that lost (or gained) political status between survey rounds do indeed become less (or more) proud of their country in the survey following the change in their status. This indicates that pride is produced by power, rather than the other way around.

These findings have important implications. They show that investigating national pride with a quasi-global sample is a feasible avenue for research, complementing more precisely focused research on particular countries or on smaller samples of cases. Substantially, they suggest that domestic politics and power are more relevant for national pride than are the factors considered by past research—a country's current position in the international system or its history of interstate wars. The message for policymakers is that a positive identification with the nation cannot be fostered without attention to the underlying structure of political power. "No national identification without political representation" could be the shorthand policy conclusion—with the proviso that such representation does not necessarily have to assume a democratic form, as I discuss below.

The article is structured in a straightforward way. The next section

introduces the argument in more detail, including a discussion of existing approaches and research findings. I then present the data set, discuss the variables used to test the exchange-theoretic, power-configurational argument, the control variables, and the model specification. A results section follows, and the final section concludes.

II. A Power-Configurational Theory of National Pride

National identity is a theoretically contested concept, perhaps because of the morally ambiguous role that nationalism has played in world affairs over the past two centuries. Many researchers have therefore sought to distinguish more benevolent forms of national identification from others, differentiating patriotism from chauvinism,[4] or a supposedly less bellicose Western nationalism from a war-prone Eastern version,[5] or a citizenship- and state-centered civic nationalism from a more intolerant, ancestry-based ethnic variant.[6] A second axis of discussion focuses on whether a strong identification with and attachment to the nation can develop only when ethnic identities have weakened or whether, on the contrary, the two levels of identification can reinforce each other, as maintained by multiculturalists.

This article is not concerned with these two discussions. Rather, it seeks to identify the conditions under which citizens see their nation in a positive light—independent both of the strength of their attachment to the nation vis-à-vis their ethnic group and of whether their national identity assumes a civic or ethnic form. From the point of view of the nation-building literature, pride in the community of fellow citizens is crucial, as it goes hand in hand with more effective government,[7] support for the welfare state,[8] and less resistance to paying taxes.[9] I also note here that national pride is conceptually and empirically distinct from how individuals see their current government. Some citizens, that is, may continue to be proud of their nation, even though a particular government may betray what they perceive as core principles and values of the nation.

How does national pride emerge? My theoretical framework is square-

---

[4] Cf. Coenders, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2004.
[5] Kohn 1944.
[6] See discussion in Brubaker 1999.
[7] Ahlerup and Hansson 2011.
[8] Qari, Konrad, and Geys 2012; but see Shayo 2009.
[9] Konrad and Qari 2012. National pride is also associated with protectionism (Mayda and Rodrik 2005), negative sentiment toward the euro (Müller-Peters 1998), and negative attitudes toward immigrant populations (Wagner et al. 2012).

ly rooted in the state-centric approach to nationalism: it assumes that nation-states have played a crucial role in the dissemination of national identities, even if these might have originally been developed by intellectuals or anticolonial movements.[10] I start with the exchange-theoretic proposition according to which individuals who regularly exchange resources—including soft resources such as recognition or prestige—with each other will eventually identify with a shared social category, a notion of "us" versus "them," that includes all stable exchange partners and excludes others.[11] Quite obviously, who exchanges resources with whom is also influenced by social categories that are already considered relevant and legitimate because these might come with the normative expectation that members privilege exchange relationships with each other over those with members of out-groups.[12] New social categories are either introduced from the outside or develop endogenously when exchange relationships within a society change.[13]

Following this logic, I do not expect citizens to embrace a national identity—perhaps despite intense nationalist propaganda by governments and state intelligentsias—if they have not already established durable exchange relationships with the central government.[14] In other words, a positive identification with the nation depends on political integration defined, in the tradition of an earlier generation of scholarship on nation-building, as the extension of political alliances from the local to the national level.[15] Those who are not integrated into the web of alliances centered on the state will identify primarily with other, subnational or transnational social categories, depending on the contours of the exchange networks they have formed.[16]

---

[10] For an overview of other approaches to nationalism, see Smith 1998; for the social bases of early nationalist movements, see Hroch 2000.

[11] This focus on transactions, rather than on network structures as in much network research, follows up on Blau 1986. See also Tilly's (2005) analysis of the emergence and transformation of trust networks. That exchange and cooperation will be accompanied by a corresponding social classification is shown by a long line of research in social psychology (from Tajfel 1981 to Kurzban, Tooby, and Cosmides 2001), which provides the microfoundations for this part of the argument.

[12] See Tilly and Harrison White's notion of "catnet," where individuals who identify as belonging to the same social category maintain a bounded network (Tilly 1978). McAdam 1988 considers how categorization and network behavior feed on each other and conjointly explain the process of political mobilization.

[13] For details, see Wimmer 2008.

[14] For pioneering rational choice research along these lines, see Levi 1989; Kiser and Linton 2001. See also the post-Tillyan emphasis on coalitions and alliances between state builders and other social groups during early modern state formation in the work of Hendrik Spruyt, Julia Adams, Philip Gorski, and others, summarized in Vu 2010.

[15] See Bendix 1964; Lemarchand 1972, 68.

[16] For a formal model and historical evidence supporting this argument, see Kroneberg and Wimmer 2012.

If family and community members of the same migrant origin support each other wherever they live around the world, individuals will develop a diasporic identity and be proud of their community's heritage. If villages or neighborhoods are key to the provision of public goods and remain detached from national-level alliance networks, a strong local patriotism will emerge.[17] If politicians mobilize ethnic ties to provide public goods independent of the central government or to gain power outside of national alliance networks, ethnic identities will appear in a positive light and individuals will be proud of their ethnic background, rather than of the nation.[18]

To understand who identifies more positively with the nation, we therefore need to analyze the power configurations at the center of the state. Which ethnic communities are represented in national government and are thus more closely tied into the exchange relationships between citizens and the state? These exchange relationships often come with tangible benefits. A long line of research has shown that citizens receive more public goods from coethnic political leaders,[19] expect such rewards when voting for specific politicians,[20] evaluate coethnic incumbents accordingly,[21] and perceive pervasive ethnic discrimination by bureaucrats of a different ethnic background.[22] Conversely, politicians are more attentive to the demands and preferences of their coethnic citizens.[23] Beyond these tangible advantages, political representation by coethnics also offers prestige, as well as a sense of empowerment and symbolic ownership of the state. I leave open how important these symbolic gains are in comparison with the more material benefits that alliances with governing elites can bring.

To analyze different power configurations, my starting point is the well-known polity model of Charles Tilly,[24] who distinguishes members of the polity—the political actors and their constituencies who are represented at the highest level of government—from those who remain without connections to the central government. Further distinctions can be made, depending on whether the polity comprises more than one clearly discernible group (the left panel in Figure 1) or whether

---

[17] See the "neighborhood nationalism" in Back 1996.
[18] Cf. Congleton 1995.
[19] For a sample of 139 countries, see de Luca et al. 2015. See also for eighteen African countries, Franck and Rainer 2012; for Kenya, see Burgess et al. 2015; Jablonski 2014; for large US cities, see Nye, Rainer, and Stratmann 2014.
[20] For urban Ghana, see Nathan 2016.
[21] For Uganda, see Carlson 2015.
[22] For three postcommunist countries, see Grødeland, Miller, and Koshechkina 2000.
[23] For South Africa, see McClendon 2016; for the United States, see Broockman 2013.
[24] Tilly 1975.

FIGURE 1
CONFIGURATIONS OF ETHNOPOLITICAL POWER

it has a more monopolistic structure (the right panel in Figure 1). In coalition governments, senior and junior partners can be distinguished according to their relative power. Outside of the polity, some groups might hold regional power, for example, in a provincial government, all the while remaining excluded from representation in national government. Farther down the political pyramid, some groups might not be represented in either national or provincial governments. And finally, discriminated-against groups are actively prevented by more powerful actors from rising through the ranks of political parties, armies, or other political institutions from which national leadership is recruited.

We can now introduce a series of empirical hypotheses at the group as well as the country levels. First, I expect a fundamental divide between groups that are represented at the highest level of government and those that are not. Excluded groups should develop a more negative attitude toward the nation than members of the polity (H1a). Correspondingly, at the country level, citizens of countries with a large share of the population without representation in national-level government should be less proud of the nation on average (H1b). Next, I expect discriminated-against groups to identify the least positively with the nation, given that their relationship with the state and the dominant group(s) precludes a mutually beneficial exchange (H2).[25]

[25] These two hypotheses are compatible with the social dominance theory developed by social psychologist Sidanius and coauthors (e.g., Sidanius and Pratto 1999). As we will see below, social dominance theory needs to be combined with a macrolevel, power-configurational approach to explain which groups are prouder of the nation than others.

We also need to include a dynamic perspective because exchange relationships change over time, as do the boundaries of the polity. Groups may move up or down the political hierarchy depicted in Figure 1. Elections, ethnic civil wars, popular revolts, or outside intervention may empower some ethnically defined elites and their constituencies while driving others from the palace of government. Following the theoretical premises outlined above, I expect groups whose political status declined in the past to see the nation in less positive terms than those whose status remained stable (H3). For example, whites in the United States should be less proud after the election of President Barak Obama. Such relative status losses reduce national pride because a decline in political status implies less favorable exchange relationships with the political center.

We need to add another consideration to the simple exchange-theoretic argument made so far. Identification with the nation depends not only on one's power status, but also on how far one can trust that this status will be maintained in the future: the prospect of stability enhances a positive view of the national community, whereas uncertainty reduces pride. Two additional hypotheses can be formulated. Citizens of countries with a fragmented polity (Figure 1, left panel) should be less proud of their nation than those living in a more monopolistic power configuration (right panel) (H4). Sanctioning noncooperative behavior across ethnic divides is more difficult than among coethnics.[26] Correspondingly, power-sharing regimes are generally more unstable because cross-ethnic alliances need to be renegotiated after elections, demographic shifts, or economic crises. Such instability raises the possibility that the coalition could break apart, a prospect that reduces trust in the future political status of polity members.[27] This, in turn, should make them less positively identified with the country—net of their current representation in central-level government.

Second, struggles over the boundaries of the polity sometimes led to armed violence. Such violence tends to "unmix" ethnic groups at the everyday level[28] and destroy alliances that cross ethnic divides. Political elites distrust each other's intentions and find it difficult to establish cooperative alliances in the aftermath of war. I thus expect less national pride among members of groups that experienced many ethnic civil

[26] Habyarimana et al. 2007.
[27] For empirical evidence that is compatible with this view, see Knack and Keefer 1997; for the conflict proneness of coalition regimes with many power-sharing partners, see Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009.
[28] Kaufmann 1996.

wars or armed conflicts in the past (H5a). The same should be true for the country level: citizens of countries with a history of repeated ethnic conflicts should be less proud of their nation than citizens of peaceful countries (H5b).

III. Other Perspectives

The Demographic Minority Hypothesis

The literature to date has focused on other ways in which the ethnic background of individuals may affect their national pride. A group of distinguished researchers argues that individuals who are members of demographic minorities identify less positively with the overarching national category. Reformulated into the language of continuous variables, national pride should increase with the size of a group (H6). Three explanations have been put forward, two of which rely on sociopsychological arguments.

The first is the so-called in-group projection model, as elaborated by Amelie Mummendey and coauthors.[29] It assumes that categories of identity are hierarchically nested into each other, as when several ethnic groups are "nested into" a nation. Members of a lower-level category tend to think that their own features and traits are prototypical of the higher-level category as well. This allows them to perceive their own group as representative of that higher-order category and to identify with that category. This perception is empirically more plausible if their group constitutes the demographic majority.

Christian Staerklé and colleagues[30] introduced a second sociopsychological argument in favor of a size effect. Following Jim Sidanius's social dominance theory, they expect an "ethnic asymmetry" in how strongly subgroup members identify with the superordinate category and with its legitimizing myths, such as nationalism.[31] Dominant groups see themselves as embodying and representing the superordinate category. In principle, social dominance theory allows for the possibility that demographic minorities are socially dominant and thus identify more positively with the nation. But in Staerklé and associates'[32] study of national identification and nationalism, dominance is equated with demographic preponderance. Majorities should be more proud of the

---

[29] Mummendey et al. 1999; Wenzel, Mummendey, and Waldzus 2007.
[30] Staerklé et al. 2010.
[31] Pratto, Sidanius, and Levin 2006, 281.
[32] Staerklé et al. 2010.

mographic minority—than the demographically dominant, but politically marginalized Shia? We therefore need a theory and data that can capture these more complex configurations.

Second, all three demographic minority arguments appropriately assume a stable configuration of groups, as demographic balances between minorities and majorities tend to change very slowly over time. But in many countries of the world, configurations of power change faster than demographic trends. In Mali, for example, a revolving door of coups and civil wars has shifted groups within the polity and outside of it at least four times since the early 1990s. Overall, only forty-two countries in the world have not experienced a change in their ethnopolitical power configuration since the Second World War. As argued above, such changes should lead groups that lose political status to identify less positively with the nation and conversely, recently empowered groups should develop a new sense of national pride.

Third, the two sociopsychological arguments are not quite specific enough as to what national identification and pride are about, perhaps because they were developed as general theories meant to apply across a wide range of contexts and topics. They make the simplifying assumption that each society is dominated by an ethnic or racial group that monopolizes economic resources, social status and prestige, health, housing, political power, and so on.[35] But symbolic, social, economic, and political dominance do not need to coincide. Economically and socially dominant groups such as whites in postapartheid South Africa or Chinese in Malaysia, for example, might be politically subordinate and not represented at the highest level of government. To explain national identification and pride, we therefore need a more specific theory that relates to political power and representation, rather than to an unspecified social dominance.

The numerous empirical tests of the demographic minority hypothesis have reached rather conflicting conclusions, due perhaps to these various theoretical ambiguities, or to the limited number of countries considered by existing research, or to the fact that each study is based on a different set of countries. Using individual-level data, Tom Smith and Seokho Kim report that in only thirteen of thirty-three International Social Survey (ISS) countries, are minorities less proud of the nation.[36] By contrast, Staerklé and coauthors show that ethnic, linguistic,

[35] Pratto, Sidanius, and Levin 2006.
[36] Smith and Kim 2006.

and religious minorities evaluate their country in less positive terms in these same thirty-three ISS countries.[37] And in his study of twenty-one countries that completed the World Values Survey (WVS), Paolo Masella finds that minorities do not identify less with the nation.[38]

Using group-level data, other authors have investigated whether larger groups identify more positively with the nation than do smaller ones. The findings are again conflicting. Masella analyzes majorities and minorities separately and finds that larger minority and majority groups are less identified with the nation in the twenty-one countries of the WVS he studies.[39] But in Robinson's sample of 246 groups in the sixteen African countries that took an Afrobarometer survey, larger groups identify more with the nation than with their ethnic groups.[40] Zachary Elkins and John Sides find that the size of minorities shows no statistical association with national pride in the fifty-one countries around the world that completed the WVS.[41]

At the country level, the demographic minority argument would expect more heterogeneous populations—made up of a large number of small groups—to identify less positively with the nation overall. But Masella[42] shows that the populations of more heterogeneous countries do not identify less with their nation, and Robinson[43] reaches the same conclusion using Afrobarometer data for sixteen countries. By contrast, according to Staerklé and associates, minorities in heterogeneous countries see their nation less positively than do minorities in homogenous countries (while there is no such association for majorities). This finding is based on thirty-three ISS countries.[44]

THE INSTITUTIONALIST ARGUMENT

The neoinstitutionalist tradition in political science also offers an argument about how national pride relates to ethnicity. According to this school of thought, institutional frameworks provide incentives for identifying with certain ethnic or national categories. Elkins and Sides have applied this approach to the problem of national pride and evaluated the classical consociational argument.[45] It maintains that minorities in countries that have proportional systems of representation in parlia-

---

[37] Staerklé et al. 2010.
[38] Masella 2013.
[39] Masella 2013.
[40] Robinson 2014.
[41] Elkins and Sides 2007.
[42] Masella 2013.
[43] Robinson 2014.
[44] Staerklé et al. 2010.
[45] Elkins and Sides 2007.

ment identify more positively with the nation (H8) because they are more likely to be represented in parliament and executive government. According to consociationalists, federalism should have the same consequences (H9) or it could, as argued by "centripetalist" authors, increase minority identification with their region and decrease national pride. [46] Identifying ninety ethnic minorities on the basis of the Minorities at Risk data set and using various waves of WVS for fifty-one countries, Elkins and Sides show that majorities and minorities alike are less proud in countries with proportional representation. [47] Minorities are more proud of the nation in federal countries, but the same does not hold for majorities. They conclude that consociational institutions have "at best mixed effects" on national pride.

This important research suffers from some of the limitations of the data it uses. The Minorities at Risk data set does not contain information on actual representation in government at either the national or the regional level, and it includes only disadvantaged groups. It is therefore difficult to answer the research question posed by institutionalists. One would first have to evaluate whether proportional representation and federalism increase minority representation at the national or regional levels, respectively (which is not the case for proportionalism). [48] In a second step, one would then see whether representation comes with national pride. This second question is what this article aims at, using a theoretical model and empirical data that allow me to address it in more precise terms.

OTHER ARGUMENTS

A series of other debates about national identification and pride should at least be mentioned. Perhaps most prominent is the debate about globalization and national identity. [49] While some argue that globalization loosens the bond between citizens and their country and weakens national pride, others maintain that the many insecurities associated with global integration and competition lead to a resurgence of national identities and pride. A second group of arguments focuses on historical legacies that may increase or decrease national pride. These include, for example, having been subject to British indirect rule, [50] which strengthened ethnic identities to the detriment of identification with and pride

---

[46] Roeder 2005.
[47] Elkins and Sides 2007.
[48] Wimmer 2013, chap. 6.
[49] Bekhuis, Lubbers, and Verkuyten 2014; Kunovich 2009; Ariely 2012.
[50] Ali et al. 2015.

in the nation; having been an Axis power during World War II,[51] which reduced pride in the nation because citizens are ashamed of the atrocities committed by their governments during the war; or having fought violent anticolonial wars of independence,[52] which united members of diverse ethnic groups under a common national identity. Last, Robinson's[53] study of African countries, which focuses mostly on arguments derived from modernization theories, finds that urbanization, the advent of mass schooling, and industrialization have reduced the salience of ethnic identities and have fostered national identification.

IV. Data and Measurements

Dependent Variable

The largest number of countries ever considered in quantitative studies of national identity or pride was sixty-four.[54] Most researchers have worked with a much smaller sample of countries, using either the iss module on national identities or the wvs. But a large number of surveys, organized by the various continental barometer organizations, have asked at least one comparable question: "How proud are you of your XY nationality?" (in some surveys: ". . . to be a citizen of XY?"). Most of the surveys allow respondents to choose from four responses ranging from "very much" to "not at all." The question asks specifically about pride to be "Swiss," for example, rather than pride in "your country." Immigrants or ethnic minorities are therefore unlikely to refer this question to the country of origin of their ancestors or to the neighboring country where coethnics represent the dominant majority (such as Croatia from the point of view of Bosnian Croats). Equally important, the question is about pride in the community of citizens (proud to be "Belgian") and not about pride in one of its component groups, such as nationalities in the case of multinational states (for example, "Flemish"). The supplementary material lists the specific questions asked in the various surveys.[55]

Drawing on Latinobarometer, Asiabarometer, Afrobarometer, the wvs, and the European Values Survey, as well as the iss, I was able, with a team of research assistants, to assemble a data set that covers 123 countries from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, from South Africa in

---

[51] Elkins and Sides 2007.
[52] Robinson 2014.
[53] Robinson 2014.
[54] Ariely 2012.
[55] Wimmer 2017b, Appendix 2.

the south to Russia in the north, from Japan in the east to the United States in the west, from very small countries such as the Maldives or Luxembourg to very large ones such as China or India. Overall, the data set contains representative samples for roughly 92 percent of the world's population. The supplementary material lists the countries, surveys, and survey waves that went into the data set.[56]

While representative at the country level, these surveys obviously did not draw representative samples of all ethnic groups with the same political status, for example, all discriminated-against individuals in Bolivia or all members of the polity in Russia. In the group-level analysis below, however, I compare national pride between such different status groups within a country. There is no way to assess whether this problem affects the results in systematic ways. But it is reassuring that when I exclude status groups with fewer than one hundred individual responses (about one-fifth of all groups), the results remain largely unchanged. To further explore this issue, I took advantage of the fact that forty-three status groups were sampled in different surveys, for example, a first time by the ISS in 2004 and then by the WVS in 2009. I calculated how similar the responses of group members were in these two surveys. As the supplementary material shows, there is no systematic relationship between sample size and the degree to which responses resemble each other across surveys.[57] If small sample sizes were a systematic problem, then the responses to the two surveys should diverge much more in the smaller samples than in the larger ones.

But what does the "how proud are you of your nation" question actually measure? Two related issues are relevant. The first refers to the underlying sentiment captured by the question. I follow Kenneth Bollen and Juan Medrano in distinguishing attachment, which refers to how important membership in one community (rather than in another) is for individuals, from moral identification, which implies a positive evaluation of the group's standing in the larger world.[58] For example, native Germans might feel very identified with the German nation but not evaluate the latter's historical role in positive terms. In other words, the strength of national identification needs to be distinguished from its valence. Indeed, I find a very weak correlation between answers to the pride question, on the one hand, and whether respondents identify primarily with the nation or with their ethnic group, on the other hand

[56] Wimmer 2017b, Appendix 3.
[57] Wimmer 2017b, Appendix 6.
[58] Bollen and Medrano 1998.

(the latter question is asked in only some of the surveys).[59] Clearly, the pride question refers to the moral, evaluative component of national identification, rather than to the strength of the attachment. I also note here that the responses to the pride question are only weakly correlated (at .16) with how respondents evaluate the current government of their country. Empirically, therefore, pride in one's nation is distinct from approval of government.

Second, we also need to consider the extent to which individuals across the world understand the pride question in similar ways (metric invariance) and whether ticking the same box actually means the same thing across countries (scalar invariance).[60] To test statistically for either metric or scalar invariance, one needs more than one question relating to the same underlying concept. Since I am working with only one, I cannot offer a technical test of metric and scalar invariance here. As previous research seems to be inconclusive due to different country samples and limited sample sizes, among other possible reasons, I think that the advantage of being able to use data from a very large number of countries outweighs the disadvantage of having to use a single question (in line with the reasoning and research strategy of Elkins and Sides).[61] Furthermore, the following should alleviate concerns about the two invariance problems.

Eldad Davidov[62] shows on the basis of the multiple questions asked in the ISS survey that there is metric invariance for a series of "how proud are you of how your country does X or Y" questions, similar to the generic pride question. But Davidov also shows that there is no scalar invariance for these questions. To come back to the previous ex-

---

[59] The correlation coefficient between answers to the pride question and a dichotomous variable indicating whether a person identifies primarily with the nation (rather than with an ethnic group or both) is 0.08 based on about 92,000 observations.

[60] Another issue relates to the question of whether a single question can capture the multidimensional nature of national identities (Davidov 2009). Based on the 2003 ISS data set and its rich catalog of questions, the consensus seems to be that at least two different components need to be distinguished. On the one hand, there is a "constructive patriotism" component that relates to a series of "proud" questions, such as "how proud are you of how democracy works in your country," "how proud are you of how minorities are treated in your country," and so on. On the other hand, a "nationalist" (or "chauvinist") component is captured by questions that suggest the superiority of one's country vis-à-vis others. There are reasons to believe that the generic "how proud of your nation" question measures overall national pride in both its "nationalist" and its "patriotic" aspects and thus serves the current purpose quite well. Bekhuis, Lubbers, and Verkuyten 2014 have demonstrated that the single question "how proud are you of your country" can capture the underlying "national identification" dimension as do the multiple questions asked in the ISS data. They found that analyzing responses to that single question led to the same substantial conclusions as were reached using multiple questions.

[61] Elkins and Sides 2007.

[62] Davidov 2009.

ample, very proud individuals in Germany might tick the "somewhat proud" box because they know that being "very proud to be German" is frowned upon—whereas "proud to be American" is the social norm in the United States. The risk of bias refers to country-level models only, however. In the group-level models presented below, country fixed effects ensure that we compare groups within, rather than across, countries. Scalar invariance problems therefore could possibly affect only half of the analysis presented below.

With this caveat about comparisons across countries in mind, I now briefly describe how the 770,000 individuals from around the world answered the pride questions. As the supplementary material shows with descriptive statistics, the world's populations are on average surprisingly proud of their nations. The global average is 3.4, thus between "somewhat proud" and "very proud."[63] The standard deviation is also small: two-thirds of all individuals around the world are between 2.7 (a bit less than "somewhat proud") and "very proud" of their nationality. Most of the European countries have average pride scores below those of the rest of the world. The same is true for some Central Asian and East Asian countries. The least prideful are Germans, and among the most proud are Laotians and Ghanaians, as well as the population of Trinidad and Tobago.

The average pride of ethnic groups varies quite a bit more. In line with the expectations of my theory, Muslims in Serbia, Russians in Latvia, and Albanians in Macedonia—all groups with a history of sustained discrimination—are among the least proud (close to "not very proud" on average), while among the proudest we find Uzbeks in Uzbekistan and Creoles (of African descent) in Trinidad and Tobago.

ETHNICITY-RELATED VARIABLES

To test the power-configurational theory outlined above, I rely on the Ethnic Power Relations data set[64] that is based on the Tillyan concept of the polity discussed above. EPR contains information on all ethnic categories around the world that are minimally politically relevant, that is, categories on whose behalf at least one actor (a political movement, a party, or an individual) with some minimal resonance in the national political arena claims to speak or categories whose members are discriminated against (and therefore considered relevant) by others.

[63] Wimmer 2017b, Appendix 1, Table 1.
[64] Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009.

EPR does not code individuals, parties, or movements as "representing" an ethnic group if these actors cannot either acknowledge their ethnic background in public or publicly attempt to pursue commonly accepted group interests. In line with constructivist notions of ethnicity, relevant categories can change over time and categories can fission or fuse. EPR is based on an encompassing definition of ethnicity[65] and includes groups differentiated on the basis of religion, language, race, profession (as in caste systems), or culture.[66]

EPR lists the political status of each of these ethnic categories for each year by evaluating whether members of these groups can be found at the highest levels of executive government, such as the cabinet in parliamentary democracies, the ruling circle of generals in military dictatorships, the politburo in communist countries, and so on. The measurement is thus conceptually independent from regime type. In line with the typology introduced above, EPR codes the extent to which group representatives dominate executive government or share power with others. Among groups not represented in central-level government, EPR distinguishes whether representatives control a regional government, such as in Catalonia, or are even actively prevented from any meaningful political representation at both the regional and the national level. This produces a seven-tier hierarchy of political status: monopoly power, a position of dominance (with only token representation of other ethnic communities), senior and junior partners in power-sharing governments, regional autonomy, no representation at either national or regional levels (or "powerless" for short), and discriminated against (see Figure 1).[67]

With the help of research assistants, I was able to connect the ethnic background information of survey respondents with one of the ethnic categories listed in the EPR data set for a total of 224 groups in sixty-four countries. This represents roughly one-third of all categories EPR lists for all countries of the world from 1946 to 2005, and almost half of the countries covered by EPR. Conversely, roughly half of the ethnic categories listed in any of the surveys could be matched to an EPR group. I took advantage of the fact that many systems of ethnic categorization are segmentally nested to use many-to-one and one-to-many

---

[65] See, for example, Wimmer 2008.

[66] I tested empirically whether different types of ethnic groups vary systematically in terms of national pride and found this generally not to be the case.

[67] For more information on EPR coding rules, see Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009, online appendix.

matching procedures, which the supplementary material describes in more detail.[68]

In addition to the political status categories, EPR contains information about the total number of ethnic civil conflicts since 1945, defined as armed confrontations between rebel groups and government troops that cost more than twenty-five individual lives. To test whether a decline in political status decreases pride in the nation, I created a variable that indicates whether a group had recently moved down in the seven-tier hierarchy described above (for example, from "dominant" to "senior partner" in the case of whites after Obama's election).[69]

The EPR data set also offers a range of country-level variables describing on the ethnopolitical power configuration. It allows me to use the full 123-country data set assembled for this project and include those countries where no information on the ethnic background of individuals was collected by the surveys or where we could not match that information to EPR categories. Three variables are of special interest here. First, the size of the excluded population measures the proportion of regionally represented, powerless, and discriminated-against groups—in other words, the share of the population that remains outside of the polity. This analysis thus complements the more fine-grained, group-level analysis of how political status affects pride. Second, the variable *power sharing* indicates whether the polity is made up of one (as in the right-hand panel of Figure 1) or more (as in the left-hand panel of Figure 1) ethnopolitical elites. Third, I count the number of ethnic armed conflicts in a country's history since 1945—the same variable that will be used for the group-level analysis.

OTHER COUNTRY-LEVEL VARIABLES

Obviously, other aspects of a country's history and current condition will influence the extent to which its citizens are proud of the nation. I tested every country-level variable that has been used to date in quantitative research, as well as a number of additional, theoretically mean-

[68] Wimmer 2017b, Appendix 5.
[69] A clarifying note on the time aspects of this coding is perhaps in order. In the group-level EPR data set, the political status variables are coded for periods that can last any number of years. During a period, the list of groups that are politically relevant in a country remains the same and the political status of all groups is identical. Conversely, whenever the list of politically relevant groups changes or any of those groups changes its political status, a new period commences. For statistical analysis, these group periods are then expanded to create a data set with years as units of observation. Declining political status is assigned to a group during all years of a period if that group held more power in the previous period. Since I matched survey with EPR years, a coding of lost power for a survey year means that members of that ethnic category had lost power sometime in the past.

ingful variables. Table 1 lists these twenty-six variables as well as the data sources. Besides standard measurements such as GDP per capita, linguistic and religious diversity (which will be used to test the demographic size argument at the country level), or population size, it includes an index of globalization, various variables to test the historical legacy arguments referenced above, some variables to explore the consociationalist theory evaluated by Elkins and Sides,[70] a series of variables related to the history of war and contemporary military power of a country, and some economic variables emphasized by previous research, as well as adult literacy rate, which refers to Anderson's[71] theory of nationalism as propelled by the rise of reading publics.

INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES

To explain national pride, we also have to take into account the differences between individuals. We were able to identify similar questions about the basic characteristics of individuals in the various surveys.[72] We already know that men are more proud of their country than are women, married individuals more than unmarried ones, older individuals more than younger, less educated more than better educated. Pride could also be influenced by an individual's political outlook because nationalism goes hand in hand with a right-wing orientation. Although we could not find corresponding questions in all the surveys, we can measure whether or not "politics is important" to the survey respondents around the world. I also included individual responses to the question of whether "religion is important," since religious individuals might identify more positively with the nation if membership in the nation is defined on the basis of religion (as in Poland, for example). I also add some basic information on the social class background of individuals.[73] Since I am not interested in explaining differences between individuals, the table with results does not show these variables, although they are included in the statistical models.

---

[70] Elkins and Sides 2007.

[71] Anderson 1991.

[72] For details, see Wimmer 2017b, Appendix 4.

[73] There are missing data on these individual-level variables (4,752 for gender; 5,031 for age; 25,989 for education; 37,980 for religiosity; 24,573 for marriage status; 94,385 for the importance of politics; and 212,004 for class). Instead of losing all these individual observations and dropping dozens of countries, I decided to amend the coding of the individual-level variables with 0 indicating missing data and then to create dummy variables for observations with missing data on each of these variables and add these to the model. Dropping observations instead does not change the main results.

TABLE 1

LIST OF COUNTRY-LEVEL CONTROL VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCE

Globalization

Index of global integration, extended 2012−, Konjunkturforschungsstelle of the ETH Zürich

Population Characteristics

Population size, interpolated, logged, World Bank World Development Indicators
Adult literacy 15+ (in %), interpolated and extended, UNESCO and Wimmer and
    Feinstein 2010
Percentage Muslim population in 2010, Pew global surveys
Religious fractionalization, Alesina et al. 2003
Linguistic fractionalization, Alesina et al. 2003

War and Military

Cumulative no. of wars fought since 1816, Wimmer and Min 2006
Number of lost interstate wars since 1816, Correlates of War Project
Share of global material capabilities, in %, logged, Correlates of War Project
Military expenditures in thousands of current USD, extended 2007−, logged, Correlates
    of War Project
War of independence, Wimmer and Min 2006 plus Correlates of War Project for
    some countries

Economics

GDP per capita in constant USD, interpolated and extrapolated, logged, World Bank
    World Development Indicators
Human Development Index, interpolated, United Nations Development Program
Gini index of inequality, interpolated, United Nations University Wider, World Bank
    Development Indicators for some countries
Landlocked country, Wikipedia

Historical Legacies

Former British dependency, Wimmer and Min 2006
Axis power during World War II
Ever a communist country, Wikipedia
Former German dependency, Wimmer and Min 2006
Years with constant borders, Wimmer and Feinstein 2010
Years since foundation of first national organization (means centered), Wimmer and
    Feinstein 2010
Years since independence, Wikipedia

Political Institutions

Combined autocracy (−10) to democracy (+10) score (interpolated), Polity2, Polity IV
    Project
Average Polity2 score between 1816 and 1990, Polity IV Project
Federation or federal system, extended from 2005−, Institutions and Elections Dataset
Proportional or mixed electoral system, extended from 2005−, Institutions and Elections
    Dataset

Modeling Approach

In line with most previous research using similar data sources, I use a multilevel approach that takes into account the fact that individual responses to the pride question are influenced simultaneously by (1) their individual characteristics, (2) the characteristics of the ethnic groups of which they are a member, and (3) the specificities of the countries of which they are citizens. I will therefore consider individual-level variables, ethnic group variables, and country variables to explain why some individuals have greater pride in their nation than others.[74] A multilevel approach also has the advantage that we can use relatively small groups in the analysis (following the advice of Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill).[75]

The appropriate specification is an ordered logit model because the outcome is a rank order, ranging from "not proud at all" to "very proud."[76] Because the data comprise of a very large number of different surveys, I checked whether the results change when I take into account the specific survey to which an individual responded. This would be the case if a survey was conducted at a moment of heightened nationalist anxiety, for example, or if the survey asked the pride question after some other questions that had already prepared individuals to focus on their national identity. The main results with "survey fixed effects" remain unchanged.

IV. Results

I first developed a country-level model based on all variables ever considered in the literature. Tables 2 and 3 of the supplementary material document the two model-building steps.[77] To begin, I ran models with

[74] As a rule of thumb, at least 5 percent of variation in the dependent variable should be situated at higher than the individual level of aggregation to justify a hierarchical model approach (Bacikowski 1981; Goldstein 2003). It turns out that in the data set, 14 percent of variation in pride is due to differences between countries and 23 percent is due to differences between ethnic groups within countries. These figures are quite high compared with what is found in other studies, and a hierarchical modeling approach is therefore in order.

[75] Gelman and Hill 2006, 275–76.

[76] Since we are interested only in the main associations between the independent variables and pride in country, rather than in whether these associations vary across countries or ethnic groups, each control variable is entered into the model as a fixed, rather than a random, effect.

All other published articles with a similar data structure ignore the ordered and bounded nature of the dependent variable. But an ordered logit is clearly preferable because the number of categories is small, and many categories are rarely or even never used (the "not proud at all" and "not very proud" categories); see Gelman and Hill 2006, 123. Ordered logit regression is not affected by the problem of heteroskedasticity because there are no error terms when the dependent variable is a probability, and we therefore cannot and should not specify robust standard errors.

[77] Wimmer 2017b, Appendix 1, tables 2 and 3.

all individual-level controls and each of these country-level variables individually, producing a set of twenty-six hierarchical models (this is to reduce collinearity problems).[78] Then, to arrive at the final model, I retained the significant variables and further eliminated those that lost significance in the combined model.[79] Because they are of core theoretical interest for this article, I retained levels of linguistic and religious diversity for the main models, although they did not produce significant results in these preliminary steps.

Since this approach to model selection is not optimal from a technical, statistical point of view, I also produced a country-level model following a Boolean technique available for multilevel models in the STAN program. The results for this robustness exercise are encouraging. The main variables of theoretical interest produce results that are substantially identical to those reported below.[80]

Let us first look at the models in Table 2 of the supplementary material to discuss which of the twenty-six country characteristics that are theoretically the most plausible are *not* associated with national pride.[81] (The variables that did turn out to be significant are discussed below.) Citizens of countries that fought many wars with other states since 1816 are neither more nor less proud than more peaceful countries,[82] and the citizens of countries that lost those wars are not less proud of the nation.[83] Isolated populations do not differ from those that are integrated into the global economy,[84] democracies do not differ from autocracies,[85] and the citizens of rich countries are not different from those of poor countries.[86]

We next evaluate the power-configurational hypotheses. In a first step, I focus on the power status of ethnic groups to explain why some individuals are more proud than others. Model 1 in Table 2 has two

[78] Wimmer 2017b, Appendix 1, Table 2.

[79] Wimmer 2017b, Appendix 1, Table 3.

[80] See Wimmer 2017b, Appendix 7. We specified a Bayesian, multilevel, ordinal logistic regression model with all the country-level and individual-level variables. We then ran four chains with one thousand warm-up iterations and one thousand sampling iterations to get the posterior distribution for the model parameters. While STAN includes a large number of nonsignificant control variables in the optimal country-level model, the ones that are significant in STAN are also relevant in the main model shown below (with the exception of an additional war variable). I decided to run the main models without the Boolean approach because the latter turned out to be computationally very demanding and time consuming.

[81] Wimmer 2017b, Appendix 1, Table 2.

[82] Wimmer 2017b, Appendix 1, Table 2, model 3.

[83] Wimmer 2017b, Appendix 1, Table 2, model 13.

[84] Wimmer 2017b, Appendix 1, Table 2, model 1.

[85] Wimmer 2017b, Appendix 1, Table 2, model 24.

[86] Wimmer 2017b, Appendix 1, Table 2, model 5. The above results are similar to the STAN models, except that the number of wars variable is significant (see Wimmer 2017b, Appendix 7).

TABLE 2

MULTILEVEL ORDERED LOGIT REGRESSIONS ON PRIDE IN ONE'S COUNTRY

	1 *Hierarchical Ordered Logit Regression with Individuals Nested into Ethnic Goups*	2 *Hierarchical Ordered Logit Regression with Individuals Nested into Countries*	3 *Hierarchical Ordered Logit Regression with Individuals Nested into Ethnic Groups Nested into Countries*
Individual-Level Variables			
Gender, age, education, social class, marriage status, importance of politics, and religiosity	included	included	included
Ethnic-Group Level Variables			
Group size	0.1358		0.1344
	(0.135)		(0.160)
Regional autonomy (reference: included groups)	−0.3371***		−0.2464**
	(0.104)		(0.113)
Powerless (reference: included groups)	−0.1322**		−0.1052*
	(0.054)		(0.058)
Discriminated against (reference: included groups)	−1.4916***		−1.5512***
	(0.125)		(0.129)
Lost power in recent past (reference: no power loss)	−0.3638***		−0.3709***
	(0.036)		(0.039)
Number of ethnic conflicts in group history	−0.4247***		−0.4538***
	(0.075)		(0.082)
Country-Level Variables			
Country fixed effects	yes	no	no
Size of the excluded population		−0.1295***	
		(0.041)	
Powersharing (polity with multiple groups)		−0.2407***	
		(0.018)	
Number of ethnic conflicts in country history		−0.1035***	
		(0.014)	
Linguistic fractionalization		0.8870	0.1786
		(0.000)	(0.474)
Religous fractionalization		−0.6793	−1.2190**
		(0.715)	(0.529)
Number of years with constant borders since 1816		0.0057***	−0.0020**
		(0.000)	(0.001)
Former British dependency		0.9783***	0.9520***
		(0.362)	(0.281)
Axis power during World War II		−0.5779	−0.6743
		(0.000)	(0.522)
Federalist country		−0.2064***	−0.0969***
		(0.019)	(0.035)
Country fixed effects	yes	no	no
Number of individuals	170,467	768,244	170,467
Number of ethnic groups	224	0	224
Number of countries	64	123	64

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; constant not shown

levels (individuals and ethnic groups) and uses country fixed effects. This means that all stable characteristics of each of the sixty-four countries—its unique climate, its geography, its specific historical past, and so on—are taken into account. It also means that groups are compared within countries, rather than across them. This model includes the 224 ethnic groups for which we could match the ethnic categories of the surveys with those of EPR.[87]

In line with the theory, model 1 shows that all groups excluded from national-level government are less proud than included groups (H1a). And in keeping with hypothesis 2, the effect is particularly pronounced for discriminated-against groups whose members are, on average, two standard deviations less proud than included groups. Groups that enjoy some political representation in provincial governments are also less proud than included groups. This is compatible with the theory, since members of such groups are expected to develop ties of alliance with and support for the regional government. Correspondingly, they should positively identify with that region or province, rather than with the nation.

Model 1 also shows that members of larger ethnic groups are neither more (H6) nor less (H7) proud of their nation than are members of smaller groups—in contrast to the demographic size argument. But could it perhaps be the case that these results are distorted because most excluded groups are considerably smaller than included groups, such that I already capture the consequence of size with the political status variables? If I restrict the sample to demographic minorities only, I again do not find that smaller groups are less proud than bigger ones (results not shown). Even among minorities, in other words, larger size does not produce national pride.[88]

Model 1 additionally reveals that members of groups that lost political status in the recent past are less proud of their country than those that maintained their political status or even improved it (H3). The effect is rather small, however. Also in line with expectations (H5a), members of groups that have engaged in many armed conflicts in the past are less proud of their nation than those with a peaceful past. The size of the effect is considerable here, as one additional armed conflict

---

[87] Since I am not interested in the individual-level variables like age or gender, I do not display them in Table 2. It suffices to note here that in line with previous research, I find that men as well as older, less educated, more politicized, and more religious persons are more proud of their country.

[88] I also explored whether differences in income between ethnic groups might affect pride because either poorer or richer groups could identify less positively with the nation, as suggested for example, by Hechter and Levi 1979. Using the geocoded version of EPR3, I found that the difference in GDP (measured through nighttime luminosity) between an ethnic group's territory and the national average does not affect levels of pride (results not shown).

in the past would imply a bit more than half of a standard deviation decrease in national pride.

A second step evaluates the same arguments with the help of country-level variables. Model 2 consists of individuals who are nested into countries. As there are no group-level variables in this model, I can take advantage of the full set of 123 countries. The theoretical expectations are again fully supported by the results: the larger the size of the excluded population, the less proud a country's population is overall (H1b). If political integration fails, in other words, the imagined community of the nation means much less to its members. The more ethnic armed conflicts were fought since 1945, the less proud citizens are (H5b)—thus replicating the finding at the group level. In addition, when power is shared between two or more ethnic elites (thus corresponding to the left panel of Figure 1), individuals are also less proud on average (H4). According to the theory, such countries are more crisis prone than are more monopolistic regimes, which in turn decreases trust in the future stability of one's political status and thus national pride in the present.

I now briefly discuss other country characteristics that are considered in model 2. Most important, the citizens of more diverse countries are not less proud of their nation. Contrary to the demographic minority argument, it does not seem to matter much if the citizens of a country speak many or few tongues or believe in the same or many different gods. If a country has existed for a long time within its current borders, its citizens will be more proud, perhaps because meaningful exchange relationships between a government and its citizens need time to develop and become institutionalized. Federalist countries have less proud populations (in line with H9). Again, that makes sense from an exchange-theoretic point of view. In such countries, many citizens will have developed exchange and alliance relationships with their provincial governments, rather than with the national government. In this context I also note that countries with proportional representation do not have more proud citizens, as the supplementary material shows.[89]

[89] Wimmer 2017b, Appendix 1, Table 2, model 14. Proportional systems also do not affect pride indirectly, for example, by increasing the number of power-sharing partners (which is not the case; see Wimmer 2013, Appendix, Table 6.2). However, proportionalism does have a moderating effect on levels of pride of excluded groups, as additional analysis shows: a three-level model with a cross-level interaction term between proportional systems and the political status as an excluded group indicates that excluded groups are less proud in proportional systems than in nonproportional systems (results not shown). This may be because in proportional systems expectations of being represented at the highest levels of government are higher than in majoritarian systems, and nonrepresentation therefore decreases pride of excluded groups even more than in majoritarian systems.

This contrasts with the findings of Elkins and Sides (and H8).[90] Returning to model 2 in Table 2, British dependencies are more proud overall—perhaps the consequence of participating in the prestige and power of the globally dominant Anglophone culture. The citizens of countries that fought on the side of the Axis during the Second World War are not less proud,[91] again in contrast to Elkins and Sides.[92]

In a third step, I combine the EPR variables at the group level with the non-EPR variables at the country level into a three-level model with individuals nested into ethnic groups nested into countries. Model 3 in Table 2 thus explores whether the group-level analysis presented in model 1 is upheld if I also control for country-level factors that may vary over time and are therefore not considered in the country fixed-effect design of model 1. Since I include group-level variables, the sample is again reduced to sixty-four countries. Model 3 does not include the EPR-derived country-level variables because they substantially overlap with the more precise group-level variables.[93]

The results at the group level are substantially identical, except that the coefficient for powerless groups is now no longer significant at standard levels. The coefficients and standard errors for discriminated groups, for the number of conflicts in a group's postwar history, and for groups that recently lost power status are very similar to those in model 1. The country-level variables also remain substantially unchanged, although the religious diversity variable is now significant and negatively associated with pride in this reduced sample of countries.

Before concluding, I would like to briefly discuss the possibility that the main findings are the product of reverse causation. Could it be that dominant groups punish ethnic communities that maintain a critical stance toward official nationalism by preventing any of their members from rising to power in national government? In this way, a lack of pride among excluded groups would be the cause and not the effect of their political disadvantage. Similarly, one could argue that ethnopolit-

---

[90] Elkins and Sides 2007.

[91] In the STAN models, countries with many years of constant borders are not significantly different from other countries. A second difference is that the number of wars fought since 1816 is positively significant in the STAN model, as mentioned in prior footnotes. The rest of the results are substantially identical (see Wimmer 2017b, Appendix 7).

[92] Elkins and Sides 2007.

[93] Including the size of the excluded population at the country level, for example, would effectively test its effect net of the political status of the ethnic group an individual is associated with. The results would be substantially difficult to interpret, unless one included cross-level interaction effects to see whether a discriminated-against individual or one who belongs to a dominant group feels more or less proud, depending on the size of the overall population that is excluded from power.

ical conflict results from a lack of national pride[94] rather than the other way around.

None of the standard ways to test this possibility are accessible, given the nature of the data. It is difficult to find an instrumental variable that affects group status but not pride. Manipulating pride in one's country in an online or laboratory setting is largely unfeasible because it is hard to imagine that subjects would find it credible if a certain political status was randomly assigned to their ethnic group. Alternatively, we can follow the responses of group members across surveys and then explore whether a change in power status leads, in the next survey, to a change in pride, as the theory predicts.

Unfortunately, there are only eight groups whose political status changed between two surveys that are reasonably close in time to each other. Of these eight groups, three (whites in the United States, Taiwanese in Taiwan, and Slovaks in Slovakia) experienced a drop in pride after their power status declined, and two (Asians and Zulus in South Africa) experienced an increase in pride after their representation in central-level government improved. One additional group (the Sunni of Iraq) experienced a severe civil war during the same year in which their power status improved. The net effect of these two conflicting trends was a decrease in pride, quite in line with theoretical expectations. Two other groups (both from Bolivia) did not conform to expectations. While far from conclusive, this within-group analysis supports the idea that access to power produces pride, rather than the other way around.

A similar analysis is not possible for the conflict mechanism because there is only one group in the data set that was sampled twice before a conflict broke out, such that I could assess whether there was a decrease in pride preceding the onset of violence. But I can compare average levels of pride of those groups that were surveyed before a first conflict broke out (it is 3.53 on the four-point scale), those that have never experienced any conflict since 1945 (which is *lower* at 3.45), and those that were surveyed for the first time after a conflict had already occurred (which is lower still at 3.43; the difference with peaceful groups is almost significant at conventional levels with a *t*-value of 1.6). Because sample sizes for the groups surveyed before war are very small and because other factors affecting both conflict and pride would have to be taken into account, we should not rely on these results too much.[95] But

---

[94] See Sambanis and Shayo 2013.

[95] Similar results are obtained at the country level: citizens of fourteen countries who were surveyed before an ethnic conflict report being proud at 3.53, while after-conflict average pride levels in these countries drop to 3.47, again a difference that is not statistically significant.

they clearly suggest that conflict reduces national pride, while a lack of pride, does not seem to be one of the drivers of conflict.

VI. Conclusions

Based on an exchange-theoretic model of identity formation, I argued that positive identification with the nation follows from political representation. Meaningful exchange relationships with the state lead individuals to embrace the nationalist narrative crafted and disseminated by political elites at the center. Conversely, individuals are less proud of the community of fellow citizens if they lack representation in national-level government or are discriminated against by political elites, if they experienced ethnopolitical conflict in the past, or if their political status has recently declined or its future is uncertain (H4).

By contrast, national pride is not associated with ethnic diversity, whether measured as religious or linguistic heterogeneity. In other words, the citizens of religiously or linguistically more heterogeneous countries, such as Tanzania or Switzerland, are not less proud of their nation than are the citizens of largely homogenous countries such as Somalia or Korea. Nor is pride a matter of group size: members of large ethnic groups are not more proud of their country than small minorities, in contrast to the arguments put forward by social psychologists and some political scientists. Taken together, these results support the idea that national pride is a matter of power and politics, rather than the demographic makeup of the population. Although I was not able to directly test whether the causal arrow may point in the other direction—that pride produces access to power rather than the other way around—the small number of cases where I could follow groups whose political status changed across surveys supported my interpretation of why power and pride go together.

Another limitation of this research is that I cannot empirically disentangle which kind of exchanges drive the association between political status and pride. Are political representation and the sense of symbolic inclusion that it entails enough or does such representation need to go hand in hand with improved access to public goods? To answer this question, a major challenge would have to be overcome: to find measurements for a large enough sample of countries of how respondents feel represented by government on the symbolic level and of the extent to which they are provided public goods by the state.

While I hope that future research will shed more light on these and other remaining issues, the present findings have important conse-

quences both for social science research on nationalism and for corresponding policy initiatives. With regard to the former, this article sidestepped the debate over whether national identities are recent inventions or transformations of much older, existing ethnic identities;[96] whether they became relevant because cultural modernization such as the rise of mass printing and literacy made imagining large-scale communities possible;[97] or whether economic modernization and industrialization forced cultural homogenization under the umbrella of a nation-state.[98] These are interesting questions if we are mainly concerned with the rise of nations and nationalism out of the premodern world of empires and dynastic kingdoms.[99]

But once modern nation-states have been established, a new set of questions arises. Who buys into the nationalist narratives crafted by state-building elites and their intellectual allies who describe the nation as the very center of the moral universe, a unique historical achievement every citizen should be proud of? In which nation-states are these nationalist discourses falling on fertile ground and in which ones do they not take root? Dozens of country studies have provided rich detail about which segments of the citizenry are more nationalist than others and what the consequences of national pride are for voting, attitudes toward immigrants, or support for the welfare state. Some survey-based studies, as discussed above, searched for patterns across two or three dozen countries. This article assumed a more encompassing perspective by evaluating the most prominent arguments with a large data set comprising answers from representative surveys of almost the entire world. It also introduced a new, relational theory of national identity based on the idea that the boundaries of imagined communities will map onto the structure of political alliance networks.

Regarding the policy debate on nation-building, the results suggest that national pride cannot be understood without paying attention to the underlying structure of political power. Citizens will not embrace the idea of the nation as a community of trust and solidarity if it is not accompanied by beneficial exchange relationships with the state. By implication, policies designed to foster a sense of national belonging and pride in severely divided societies should focus on these macropolitical configurations. Speculating beyond the empirical scope of this article, it may well be that populist rhetoric and cultural propa-

[96] Smith 1986.
[97] Anderson 1991.
[98] Gellner 1983.
[99] See Wimmer and Feinstein 2010.

ganda, conveyed in school textbooks or through the invention of traditions such as anthems, public rituals, and the like, are less effective than nation-builders believe. They may not suffice for citizens to develop a strong sense of national community if not accompanied by political participation and effective integration into the political alliance networks centered on the state.

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

Supplementary material for this article can be found at https://doi.org/10.1017 /S0043887117000120.

REFERENCES

Ahlerup, Pelle, and Gustav Hansson. 2011. "Nationalism and Government Effectiveness." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 39, no. 3: 431–51. doi: 10.1016/j .jce.2011.05.001.

Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterley, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg. 2003. "Fractionalization." *Journal of Economic Growth* 8, no. 2: 155–194. doi: 10.1023/A:1024471506938.

Ali, Merima, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Boqian Jiang, and Abdulaziz B. Shifa. 2015. *Colonial Legacy, State-Building and the Salience of Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute.

Anderson, Benedict. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London, UK: Verso.

Ariely, Gal. 2012. "Globalisation and the Decline of National Identity? An Exploration across Sixty-Three Countries." *Nations and Nationalism* 18, no. 3: 461–82. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8129.2011.00532.x.

Bacikowski, Robert S. 1981. "Statistical Power with Group Mean as the Unit of Analysis." *Journal of Educational Statistics* 6, no. 3: 267–85. doi: 10.2307 /1164877.

Back, Les. 1996. *New Ethnicities and Urban Culture: Racism and Multiculture in Young Lives*. Oxfordshire, UK: Routledge.

Bekhuis, Hidde, Marcel Lubbers, and Maykel Verkuyten. 2014. "How Education Moderates the Relation between Globalization and Nationalist Attitudes." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 26, no. 4: 487–500. doi: 10.1093 /ijpor/edt037.

Bendix, Reinhard. 1964. *Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies in Our Changing Social Order*. New York, N.Y.: John Wiley.

Blau, Peter M. 1986. *Exchange and Power in Social Life*, rev. ed. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers.

Bollen, Kenneth, and Juan Diez Medrano. 1998. "Who Are Spaniards? Nationalism and Identification in Spain." *Social Forces* 77, no. 2: 587–621. doi: 10.2307 /3005540.

Broockman, David E. 2013. "Black Politicians Are More Intrinsically Motivated to Advance Blacks' Interests: A Field Experiment with Manipulating Political Incentives." *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 3: 521–36. doi: 10.1111 /ajps.12018.

Brubaker, Rogers. 1996. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1999. "The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distinction between 'Civic' and 'Ethnic' Nationalism." In Hans-Peter Kriesi, Klaus Armingeon, Hannes Siegrist, and Andreas Wimmer, eds., *Nation and National Identity: The European Experience in Perspective*. Chur, Switzerland: Rüegger.

Burgess, Robin, Remi Jedwab, Edward Miguel, Ameet Morjaria, and Gerard Padro i Miquel. 2015. "The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya." *American Economic Review* 105, no. 6: 1817–51. doi: 10.1257/aer.20131031.

Carlson, Elizabeth. 2015. "Ethnic Voting and Accountability in Africa: A Choice Experiment in Uganda." *World Politics* 67, no. 2 (April): 353–85. doi: 10.1017/S0043887115000015.

Coenders, Marcel, Mérove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers. 2004. "Chauvinism and Patriotism in 22 Countries." In Mérove Gijsberts, Louk Hagendoom, Peer Scheepers, eds., *Nationalism and Exclusion of Migrants: Cross-National Comparisons*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate: 26–69.

Congleton, Roger D. 1995. "Ethnic Clubs, Ethnic Conflict, and the Rise of Ethnic Nationalism." In Albert Breton et al., eds., *Nationalism and Rationality*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press: 71–97.

Davidov, Eldad. 2009. "Measurement Equivalence of Nationalism and Constructive Patriotism in the ISSP: 34 Countries in a Comparative Perspective." *Political Analysis* 17, no. 1: 64–82. doi: 10.1093/pan/mpn014.

de Luca, Giacomo, Roland Hodler, Paul A. Raschky, and Michele Valsecchi. 2015. "Ethnic Favoritism: An Axiom of Politics?" Working Paper no. 5209. Munich, Germany: Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute.

Deutsch, Karl W. 1953. *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Elkins, Zachary, and John Sides. 2007. "Can Institutions Build Unity in Multi-Ethnic States?" *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 4: 693–708. doi: 10.1017/S0003055407070505.

Franck, Raphaël, and Ilia Rainer. 2012. "Does the Leader's Ethnicity Matter? Ethnic Favoritism, Education and Health in Sub-Saharan Africa." *American Political Science Review* 106, no. 2: 294–325. doi: 10.1017/S0003055412000172.

Gellner, Ernest. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Gelman, Andrew, and Jennifer Hill. 2006. *Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Goldstein, Harvey. 2003. *Multilevel Statistical Models*. London, UK: Edward Arnold.

Grødeland, Ase B., William L. Miller, and Tatyana Y. Koshechkina. 2000. "The Ethnic Dimension to Bureaucratic Encounters in Postcommunist Europe: Perceptions and Experience." *Nations and Nationalism* 6, no. 1: 43–66. doi: 10.1111/j.1354-5078.2000.00043.x.

Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?" *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 4: 709–25. doi: 10.1017/S0003055407070499.

Hechter, Michael, and Margaret Levi. 1979. "The Comparative Analysis of Ethno-regional Movements." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 2, no. 3: 260–74. doi: 10.1080/01419870.1979.9993268.

Hroch, Miroslav. 2000. *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European Nations*. Trans. Ben Fowkes. New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press.

Jablonski, Ryan S. 2014. "How Aid Targets Votes: The Impact of Electoral Incentives on Foreign Aid Distribution" *World Politics* 66, no. 2 (April): 293–330. doi: 10.1017/S0043887114000045.

Kaufmann, Chaim. 1996. "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars." *International Security* 20, no. 4: 136–75. doi: 10.1162/isec.20.4.136.

Kiser, Edgar, and April Linton. 2001. "Determinants of the Growth of the State: War and Taxation in Early Modern France and England." *Social Forces* 80, no. 2: 411–48. doi: 10.1353/sof.2001.0099.

Knack, Stephen, and Philip Keefer. 1997. "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112, no. 4: 1251–88. doi: 10.1162/003355300555475.

Kohn, Hans. 1944. *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study of Its Origins and Background*. New York, N.Y.: Collier.

Konrad, Kai A., and Salmai Qari. 2012. "The Last Refuge of a Scoundrel? Patriotism and Tax Compliance." *Economica* 79, no. 315: 516–33. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2011.00900.x.

Kroneberg, Clemens, and Andreas Wimmer. 2012. "Struggling over the Boundaries of Belonging: A Formal Model of Nation-Building, Ethnic Closure, and Populism." *American Journal of Sociology* 118, no. 1: 176–230. doi: 10.1086/666671.

Kunovich, Robert M. 2009. "The Sources and Consequences of National Identification." *American Sociological Review* 74, no. 4: 573–93. doi: 10.1177/000312240907400404.

Kurzban, Robert, John Tooby, and Leda Cosmides. 2001. "Can Race Be Erased? Coalitional Computation and Social Categorization." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 98, no. 26: 15387–392. doi: 10.1073/pnas.251541498.

Lemarchand, René. 1972. "Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-Building." *American Political Science Review* 66, no. 1: 68–90. doi: 10.2307/1959279.

Levi, Margaret. 1989. *Of Rule and Revenue*. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.

Masella, Paolo. 2013. "National Identity and Ethnic Diversity." *Journal of Population Economics* 26, no. 437–54. doi: 10.1007/s00148-011-0398-0.

Mayda, Anna Maria, and Dani Rodrik. 2005. "Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist than Others?" *European Economic Review* 49, no. 6: 1393–1430. doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.01.002.

McAdam, Doug. 1988. *Freedom Summer*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

McClendon, Gwyneth H. 2016. "Race and Responsiveness: An Experiment with South African Politicians." *Journal of Experimental Political Science* 3, no. 1: 60–74. doi: 10.1017/XPS.2015.10.

Midgal, Joel S. 2001. *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Miguel, Edward. 2004. "Tribe or Nation? Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania." *World Politics* 56, no. 3 (April): 327–62. doi: 10.1017/S0043887100004330.

Müller-Peters, Anke. 1998. "The Significance of National Pride and National Identity to the Attitude toward the Single European Currency: A Europe-Wide Comparison." *Journal of Economic Psychology* 19, no. 6: 701–19. doi: 10.1016/S0167-4870(98)00033-6.

Mummendey, Amelie, Thomas Kessler, Andreas Klink, and Rosemarie Mielke. 1999. "Strategies to Cope with Negative Social Identity: Predictions by Social Identity Theory and Relative Deprivation Theory." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 76, no. 2: 229–45. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.76.2.229.

Nathan, Noah L. 2016. "Local Ethnic Geography, Expectations of Favoritism, and Voting in Urban Ghana." *Comparative Political Studies* 49, no. 14: 1896–1929. doi: 10.1177/0010414016655540.

Nye, John V. C., Ilia Rainer, and Thomas Stratmann. 2014. "Do Black Mayors Improve Black Relative to White Employment Outcomes? Evidence from Large US Cities." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 31, no. 2: 383–430. doi: 10.1093/jleo/ewu008.

Pratto, Felicia, Jim Sidanius, and Shana Levin. 2006. "Social Dominance Theory and the Dynamics of Intergroup Relations: Taking Stock and Looking Forward." *European Review of Social Psychology* 17, no. 1: 271–320. doi: 10.1080/10463280601055772.

Qari, Salmai, Kai A. Konrad, and Benny Geys. 2012. "Patriotism, Taxation and International Mobility." *Public Choice* 151, no. 3–4: 695–717. doi: 10.1007/s11127-011-9765-3.

Robinson, Amanda Lea. 2014. "National versus Ethnic Identification in Africa: Modernization, Colonial Legacy, and the Origins of Territorial Nationalism." *World Politics* 66, no. 4 (October): 709–46. doi: 10.1017/S0043887114000239.

Roeder, Philip G. 2005. "Power Dividing as an Alternative to Ethnic Power Sharing." In Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil War*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press: 51–82.

Sambanis, Nicholas, and Moses Shayo. 2013. "Social Identification and Ethnic Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 2: 294–325. doi: 10.1017/S0003055413000038.

Shayo, Moses. 2009. "A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class and Redistribution." *American Political Science Review* 103, no. 2: 147–74. doi: 10.1017/S0003055409090194.

Sidanius, Jim, and Felicia Pratto. 1999. *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, Anthony D. 1986. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

———. 1998. *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism*. London, UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Smith, Tom W., and Seokho Kim. 2006. "National Pride in Comparative Perspective: 1995/6 and 2003/4." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 18, no. 1: 127–36. doi: 10.1093/ijpor/edk007.

Staerklé, Christian, Jim Sidanius, Eva G. T. Green, and Ludwin E. Molina. 2010. "Ethnic Minority-Majority Asymmetry in National Attitudes around the World: A Multilevel Analysis." *Political Psychology* 31, no. 4: 491–519. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00766.x.

Tajfel, Henri. 1981. *Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, Charles. 1975. "Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation." In Charles Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press: 601–38.

———. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, Pa.: Addison-Wesley.

———. 2005. *Trust and Rule*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Vu, Tuong. 2010. "Studying the State through State Formation." *World Politics* 62, no. 1 (January): 148–75. doi: 10.1017/S0043887109990244.

Wagner, Ulrich, Julia C. Becker, Oliver Christ, Thomas F. Pettigrew, and Peter Schmidt. 2012. "A Longitudinal Test of the Relation between German Nationalism, Patriotism, and Outgroup Derogation." *European Sociological Review* 28, no. 3: 319–32. doi: 10.1093/esr/jcq066.

Wenzel, Michael, Amelie Mummendey, and Sven Waldzus. 2007. "Superordinate Identities and Intergroup Conflict: The Ingroup Projection Model." *European Review of Social Psychology* 18, no. 1: 331–72. doi: 10.1080/10463280701728302.

Wimmer, Andreas. 2008. "The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multilevel Process Theory." *American Journal of Sociology* 113, no. 4: 970–1022. doi: 10.1086/522803.

———. 2013. *Waves of War: Nationalism, State-Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2017a. "Replication material for 'Power and Pride: National Identity and Ethnopolitical Inequality around the World.'" Harvard Dataverse, V1. doi: 10.7910/DVN/K1WVVI.

———. 2017b. Supplementary material for "Power and Pride: National Identity and Ethnopolitical Inequality around the World." At https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887117000120.

Wimmer, Andreas, and Brian Min. 2006. "From Empire to Nation-State: Explaining Wars in the Modern World, 1816–2001." *American Sociological Review* 71, no. 6: 867–97. doi: 10.1177/000312240607100601.

Wimmer, Andreas, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min. 2009. "Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set." *American Sociological Review* 74, no. 2: 316–37. doi: 10.1177/000312240907400208.

Wimmer, Andreas, and Yuval Feinstein. 2010. "The Rise of the Nation-State across the World, 1816 to 2001." *American Sociological Review* 75, no. 5: 764–90. doi: 10.1177/0003122410382639.